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Los movimientos nacionalistas son una clase de movimiento social, pero son un movimiento 
social atípico porque priorizan la nacion, la identidad nacional y los intereses nacionales. 
Como con la mayoría de los movimientos que actúan alrededor del eje de la identidad 
nacional, la Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC), siguió la estrategia de presentarse como la 
voz del pueblo catalán. Liderado por la ANC, Cataluña ha experimentado la mayor serie de 
movilizaciones populares sostenidas vistas en la Europa moderna. Han sido alimentados por 
el resentimiento y la frustración por las limitaciones de la autonomía, por las heridas de la 
memoria histórica y la ira engendrada por la crisis económica. El rendimiento a través de la 
visualización y la coreografía de grandes multitudes se convirtió en la forma de 
comunicación política. Aun así, después de siete años de actuación, la meta principal de la 
ANC, la independencia de Cataluna no está en el horizonte. El movimiento independentista 
catalán elaboró con éxito un vocabulario ideológico distintivo, basándose en su sloganeering 
y comunicando un mensaje simple. Sin embargo, esta simplicidad llevó a una gran 





Territorial tensions have been a constant feature of Spain’s political landscape, the last 
unresolved legacy of Spain’s tumultuous twentieth century. Since 2008, with varying degrees 
of intensity, Spain has experienced its worst institutional crisis since the death of Franco. 
Catalonia has been at the epicentre of Spain’s political crisis, particularly around its territorial 
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dimension.1 By the autumn of 2017 and beyond, the Catalan question had become the gravest 
political crisis in Spain since the 23F, becoming central even to the general election held in 
November 2019. At an earlier stage in the economic crisis, a rupture to political cultures 
occurred with the 15M and the Catalan independence movement, between 2011 and 2012, 
with both movements producing a proliferation of civic platforms, processes, associations 
and challenges to traditional party systems. 2 Whilst the indignados capitalised the early wave 
of protest yet soon faded from view, by the end of 2019, the Catalan sovereignty movement 
had achieved waves of mobilisation lasting over ten years. Annual mobilisation and 
conventional political activity marked the period until the autumn of 2017. New mechanisms 
and strategies emerged from October 2017 following the failure of separation from Spain.  
 
 
The sustained basis of the Catalan sovereignty movement may simply be explained by 
the power of national identity as a collective sentiment combined with the sense that 
sustained action will be able to alter conditions and politics it seeks to address.3 The ideology 
of national self-determination validates moral claims of a distinct “people” to self-
determination.4 The people are framed as a single unified political subject with the nation 
projected as the natural political community. National identity is a form of social identity that 
can find powerful expression in a social movement or struggle. Social movement and 
collective mobilisation theory has paid little attention to cultural or nationalist movements, in 
spite of the fact that movements of this kind engage in mobilisation and even disruptive 
activity. Yet, ‘El nacionalismo, al menos en determinadas coyunturas históricas, también es 
un movimiento social; y además en determinados momentos de esas coyunturas — adopta 
aspectos típicos de los nuevos movimientos sociales.’5 Ethnic and nationalist movements are 
seen to differ from other types of social movements because they make demands and social 
 
1 PORTOS, Martín, ‘Taking to the Streets in the Shadow of Austerity: A Chronology of the Cycle of Protests in 
Spain, 2007-2015’, Partecipazione e Conflitto, vol. 9, no. 1, 2016, pp. 181–210. 
2 DOWLING, Andrew, ‘A Tale of Two Cities Madrid and Barcelona in Spain’, in COLE, Alistair and PAYRE, 
Raymond (eds.), Cities as Political Objects: Historical Evolution, Analytical Categorisations and 
Instutionalisation Changes of Metropolitanisation, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2016, pp. 79–96. 
3 KLANDERMANS, Bert, The Social Psychology of Protest, Wiley, Chichester, 1997, p. 179. 
4 OLZAK, Susan, ‘Ethnic and Nationalist Social Movements’, in SNOW, David, SOULE, Sarah and KRIESI, 
Hanspeter, The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, Blackwell, Oxford, 2004, pp. 666-693. 
5 GUELL, Pedro Ibarra, ‘Movimientos naconalistas: el nacionalismo radical vasco: epílogo’, en Pedro Ibarra 
Güell coord., Nuevos escenarios, nuevos retos en la red: anuario de movimientos sociales, Icaria, Barcelona, 
2003, págs. 177-191. 
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claims of group identity and/or self-determination. Political nationalism articulates a 
powerful combination of legitimacy and loyalty. It is nationalism that enables the ideological 
coherence of horizontal loyalty. Our purpose in this article is to analyse the origins, character 
and development of the Assemblea Nacional Catalana, ANC, as well as to assess its overall 
political effectiveness.  
 
Defining social movements 
 
Social movements are commonly interpreted as a form of contentious politics.6 The 
defining political characteristic of social movements is usually viewed as their willingness to 
violate the norms of political behaviour and potentially the norms of law and order. The idea 
of "protest" is the contentious activity most commonly associated with social movements.7 
We can expect to see repeated public displays of collective action by people acting outside of 
officially sanctioned channels to achieve social change.8 Social movement actors engage in 
political or cultural conflicts with the aim to promote, or oppose, social change. These actions 
may include street protests, picketing, marches, sit-ins, as well as actions that can range from 
letter-writing campaigns to organised boycotts. Social movements are distinguished from 
political parties by using means other than institutionalized political channels to pursue their 
goals. Social movements develop ‘when a feeling of dissatisfaction spreads and insufficiently 
flexible institutions are unable to respond’.9 Social movements connect individuals, 
organisations and networks to other actors in a broader collective mobilisation for concreate 
purposes: ‘social movements are deeply involved in the work of “naming” grievances, 
connecting them to other grievances and constructing larger frames of meaning that will 
resonate with a population`s cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform message to 
 
6 MCADAM, Doug, TARROW, Sidney and TILLY, Charles, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2001. 
7 MEYER, David S., The Politics of Protest: Social Movements in America, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2006. 
8 TILLY, Charles, Contentious Performances, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008. 








Is the Assemblea Nacional Catalana a social movement? From its initial inception in 
2011 until its official launch in March 2012, it sought to avoid any sense of being a 
organisation that bore resemblance to the 15-M/indignados.12 It defined itself as a 
representative of civic society. The ANC, between 2012 and 2017, was distinguished from 
the traditional range of social movements by its tactical and strategic moderation. Aberle 
identified four kinds of social movements (alternative, redemptive, reformative and 
revolutionary) and the Catalan sovereignty movement clearly falls within the category of 
reformative.13 The ANC, in its period of dominance, together with its ally Òmnium Cultural, 
sought to affirm a culture of civic engagement around a series of social and political values. 
Part of the social values of the ANC can be traced to a deeply rooted Catalan culture of social 
organisation which have long depended on the commitment of volunteers. This includes the 
scout movement, cultural activism, excursionisme and those charged with the organisation of 
the young known as esplai. By 2002, the esplai, for example, relied on over 5000 volunteers 
for the summer camps it organised across Catalonia. Over 40,000 associations are found in 
Catalonia devoted to areas of culture, sport and welfare asistencial as well as professional 
organisations. Deeply embedded civic organisation has long been as a distinctive 
characteristic of Catalan society.14  
 
The peculiar variant of social movement that emerged in Catalonia was not 
transformative.15 It embodied profound loyalty to Catalan institutions, including the 
autonomous police force, the local bureaucracy and institutional representatives at all levels. 
Loyalty of this kind is rare in a social movement hence our reservation about applying this 
 
10 TARROW, Sidney, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 144.  
11 SNOW, David A. and BENFORD, Robert, ‘Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,’ 
International Sociological Movement Research, Vol. 1, 1998, pp. 197–218. 
12 MARTí, Pere, El dia que Catalunya va dir prou. La història inedita de l’Assemblea Nacional Catalana, 
Columna: Barcelona, 2014, p. 22. 
13 SHANNAHAN, Chris, A Theology of Community Organizing: Power to the People, Routledge, London, 
2014, pp. 73–4. 
14 Àngel FONT, Història Contemporània de Catalunya, L’associacionisme cultural, esportiu i assistencial, 
Personatges de Catalunya, Barcelona, 2003. 
15 Although we argue that the ANC fails to fall within the full definition of social movement, for shorthand we 
will use this term. 
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analytical category in the case of the ANC. The movement led by the ANC is reformist, 
peaceful, non-violent whilst also highly innovative. Until the autumn of 2017, it consciously 
avoided any strategy of passive or active resistance or civil disobedience. A further and 
important distinguishing characteristic as to why the ANC fails to be a social movement is 
the clear and persistent bilateral relationship that has existed between it and the Catalan 
regional (pro-independence) government that has been in place since 2012 as well as a whole 
range of other institutional representatives.16 From its foundation in early 2012, to its 
organisation of the first mass scale Diada protest of 2012, direct channels of communication 
existed between the ANC and the regional government of Artur Mas. Finally, unlike most 
social movements which operate under difficult financial constraints, the ANC has become a 
successful commercial operation to finance its activities. The ANC has been an important and 
often key actor within the broader sovereignty movement, but within one that has 
encompassed institutions, political parties and cultural organisations.  
 
Although the economic crisis has shattered trust in institutions in much of southern 
Europe, in Catalonia this gave credibility to popular mobilisation outside of political parties 
without being a rejection of the party system. The ANC has sought to act as a lobby or 
pressure on the Catalan party system, without any sense of its overthrow. Whilst this was in 
one sense an anti-establishment revolt, it was only a revolt against the Spanish establishment. 
The only rupture is with Spanish legality which is to be replaced by a Catalan legality, 
without any change made to the structures of power, wealth distribution or social structure. 
The turn to secession within Catalonia is inexplicable without understanding the 
radicalisation of conservative and traditionalist sectors of Catalan society. These social 
sectors determined the trajectory of the ANC and its political nature. Once the left was no 
longer the hegemonic element within the pro-independence movement, as it had been until 
the early 2000s, but was one of several sectors, the need for what became known as 
transversality became necessary. This increasingly gave an at times confused and imprecise 
non-ideological tone to the movement. Catalonia has long been one of the richest regions of 
Spain and the middle classes within the region enjoyed comparative privilege. The province 
of Girona, deeply imbricated with pro-secessionist sentiment, is the richest region in all of 
Spain. This social sector, comparatively privileged, was traumatised by the arrival of the 
 
16 MARTÍNEZ, Guillem, La Gran Ilusión. Mito y realidad del proceso indepe, Debate, Barcelona, 2016, pp. 
147-148 and 151. 
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intense economic crisis in Spain between 2009 and 2010. Many commentators have noted 
how it is the middle-class experience of precarity that has led to its increasing political 
engagement.17 The call within Catalan sovereignty for unity over differences in social and 
economic policies until independence was achieved, effectively subordinated any narrative of 
social change to the margins.  
 
Radical challenge to class relations, hierarchy or the market economy are absent in the 
sovereignty movement, outside of minoritarian sectors. However, these are not the only 
measures to gauge the effectiveness of a movement such as the ANC, and those entities that 
preceded it have played a fundamental role in shifting the focus of Catalan politics towards 
the territorial dimension framed around sovereignty. The ANC was required to suspend 
substantial ideological debate around social issues, instead speaking in generalities of “una 
Cataluña para todos”, to avoid rupturing an organisation with divergent ideological positions. 
The national question or, more accurately, the independence question, became the sole 
repository of mobilisation. In marked contrast to the Scottish campaign centred around 
concrete and specific ideas of social justice, the ANC has been required to steer clear of such 
notions.18 The ANC is a reflection of the social structure of Catalonia over the post-Franco 
period. The movement is close to hegemonic in the interior, les comarcas, where Spanish 
speaking migration is lower than 20 per cent, where all social classes use the Catalan 
language and pro-sovereignty voting behaviour is well above 60 per cent. The ANC receives 
strong support from public sectors such as education and health, small businesses as well as 
those sectors of the middle class who have seen their class and social position threatened 
since 2008. Furthermore, amongst these sectors, the wider Spanish market is of little 
importance. The comparative weakness of the ANC in the greater urban zones from 
Barcelona to Tarragona, where the organisation is important but not dominant, is one further 
reflection of Catalan class structure. 
 
17 THERBORN, Göran, ‘Class in the 21st Century’, New Left Review, Nov-Dec 2012, pp. 5-29; ESTANQUE, 
Elísio, ‘Middle-Class Rebellions? Precarious Employment and Social Movements in Portugal and Brazil (2011-
2013)’, RCCS Annual Review, Vol. 7, October 2015,  pp. 17-44 and  NACHTWEY, Oliver,  Germany's Hidden 
Crisis: Social Decline in the Heart of Europe, Bloomsbury, London, 2019. 
 
18 SCOTT, Andrew, ‘Economics and National Autonomy’, in McHARG, Aileen, MULLEN, Tom and 
WALKER, Neil, (eds.), The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications, 






If the ANC fails to fall within the category of full social movement is it perhaps a 
grassroots movement? Strategic goals and tactical approaches are what determines 
categorisation as grassroots activity.19 Grassroots movements can share similarities to social 
movements based on collective activity and can advocate (peaceful) demonstrations, protest 
petitions etc. However, the key distinguishing category of a grassroots type of organisation is 
that they are usually campaigning entities. Grassroots movements involve activity that does 
not break the law and are not disruptive. Furthermore, whilst grassroots movements are 
ideological, their ideology is weakly elaborated.20 They build a culture of inclusion and 
encourage member participation, whilst building a new ethical framework.21 Given the scale 
of activity undertaken by the ANC between 2012 and 2017, we argue that whilst the 
organisation falls short of being a social movement yet its activity is also beyond that of a 
traditional a grassroots movements. Therefore, the ANC is sui generis, straddling both of 
these analytical categories.  
 
Political opportunity structure: the economic crisis and the Estatut 
 
Political opportunities are key to the potential for social movements and political 
activity. Political opportunity includes the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized 
political system; the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments; the presence 
or absence of elite allies and finally the state`s capacity and propensity for repression. 22 
Opportunities are external and can appear when the state order is perceived to be in crisis.23 
 
19 SYMANSKI, Ann-Marie E, Pathways to Prohibition: Radicals, Moderates, and Social Movement Outcomes, 
Duke University Press, Durham, 2003, p. 211.  
20 SMITH, David Horton, Grassroots Associations, Sage Publications, London, 2000, pp. 92-94. 
21 HART, Stephen M., Cultural Dilemmas of Progressive Politics: Styles of Engagement among Grassroots 
Activists, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001, p. 17. 
22 GUIGNI, Marco, ‘Political Opportunities: From Tilly to Tilly’, Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 15 No. 2, 
2009, pp. 361–68. 
23 GRASSO, Maria and GIUGNI, Marco, ‘Protest participation and economic crisis: The conditioning role of 
political opportunities’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 55, 2016, pp. 663–680. 
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These opportunities can be framed discursively.24 In the case of Catalonia, a frame was built 
that Spain was a state in crisis and a real opportunity to achieve secession had appeared on 
the horizon.25 Catalan society was convulsed, particularly between 2011 and 2013 as austerity 
ruptured social stability. Since this point, the Spanish state has faced a legitimacy crisis in 
Catalonia, as have, to some extent, the Catalan political parties. This led to the emergence of 
a belief that the movement faced a once in a generation opportunity to break with Spain and 
this opportunity must be grasped.26 The slow gestation of the Estatut between 2006 and 2010, 
with the legal judgement appearing in the middle of an intense economic crisis, provided the 
contextual opportunity for the advance of Catalan secession. The decision of the Spanish 
Supreme Court in 2010 concerning the Estatut was the precipitating event that fed into an 
already existing accumulation of grievances. Cultural, language and quasi political 
associations were increasingly united in a common purpose.  
 
The gestation of the ANC 
 
Strategies to build social support for independence led to the appearance of varying 
forums between 2006 and 2012. The first large-scale civic mobilisation was 18 February 
2006, a protest mobilising over 200,000 people. This early expression of popular pro-
independence sentiment was led by Plataforma pel Dret de Decidir, which acted as an 
umbrella organisation for over 700 entities. The demonstration, whilst directly linked to the 
impasse over the Estatut, had a clear secessionist message. This was followed on 1 December 
2007, with over 700,000 protesting in Barcelona over failures related to Catalan 
infrastructure, which linked economic grievance with pro-independence sentiment. These 
mobilisations cemented the status of organisations autonomous of the party system. As the 
legislation for the new Catalan Estatut, passed in 2006 was being assessed by the Spanish 
Supreme Court, increasingly political frustration saw the secessionist narrative in the 
ascendant. Between September 2009 and April 2011, Catalonia experienced a lengthy cycle 
of mobilisation. This took the form of a popular initiative for a non-binding referendum 
campaign whose sole purpose was to ask whether Catalonia should become an independent 
 
24 OPP, Karl-Dieter, Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, 
Critique, and Synthesis, Routledge, London, 2009, p. 25. 
25 Full. Declaració de la Sectorial del movement obrer de ‘Assemblea Nacional Catalana, marzo de 2012, Caixa 
1, Fons Assemblea Nacional Catalana, Centre Documental de la Comunicació, CEDOC. 
26 Full ‘Ara és l’hora. Ara en tenim l’oportunitat’, Carpeta 2014, Assemblea Nacional Catalana, CEDOC. 
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state within the European Union. The principal purpose of these mobilisations was to raise 
social awareness of sovereignty.27 Over 800,000 people in some 500 municipalities took part, 
with the process culminating in the city of Barcelona in April 2011. To facilitate the 
organisation, over 25,000 amateur activists participated. This cycle of referendums lasted 
over a year and a half. 28 The Plataforma subsequently imploded due to factionalism. 
However, the skills honed by the Plataforma during the long wave of consultations between 
2009 and 2011 left an already existing organisational base ready for utilisation which led to 
the creation of the Assemblea Nacional Catalana over 2011.29 Both the Assemblea Nacional 
Catalana and other entities embraced horizontal networks and organisational structures as a 
deliberate tactic of distancing from the vertically organised political parties. The ANC sought 
to build a new kind of organisational model built around concentric circles arranged by 
location, profession and level of activism.  
 
The Structure of the ANC 
 
Social movements and campaigning organisations exhibit a range of structural forms. 
Traditional social movements contain little in terms of organisational structure and are able to 
act spontaneously. Social movement organisations however are organised. Organisational 
forms can include horizontal and vertical layers, degree of formal relationship and level of 
centralization.30 Social and campaigning organisations are further marked by the level of 
commitment and activism expected of members or supporters. Furthermore they enable the 
shift from a personal to a social identity.31 The ANC has activists, members and supporters. 
Following its official launch, membership rose quickly and peaked at 80,000 by 2014. 
However, membership is not coterminous with activism. Whilst the ANC has striking 
mobilisational capacity every 11 September from 2012, attendance at a single annual event 
 
27 XIMENIS, Josep Manel, D’Arenys de Munt al Cel: L’inici de les Consultes Independentistes, CIM Edicions, 
Barcelona, 2010, pp. 198–9. 
28 GUIJOAN, Marc and RODON, Toni, ‘Catalonia at the Crossroads: Analysis of the Increasing Support for 
Secession’, in MORATÓ, Xavier Cuadras (ed.), Catalonia: A New Independent State in Europe? A Debate on 
Secession within the European Union, Routledge, London, 2016, pp. 20–59. 
29 BOSCH, Joan, Moments Estel·lars de Catalunya, La Campana, Barcelona, 2014, p. 194. 
30 WILLEMS, Jurgen and  JEGERS, Marc, ‘Social Movement Structures in Relation to Goals and Forms of 
Action: An exploratory model’, Canadian Journal of Nonprofit and Social Economy Research-Revue 
canadienne de recherche sur les OBSL et l’économie sociale, Vol. 3, No 2, Fall / Automne, 2012, pp. 67 – 81. 
31 HOGG, Michael and TURNER, Thomas, ‘Intergroup behaviour, self-stereotyping and the salience of social 
categories’, British Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 26 No. 4, 1987, pp. 325–340. 
10 
 
was testimony to the low commitment of supporters (not members). The ANC is highly 
effective at the marshalling of political solidarity yet little was demanded of most supporters. 
In this, it was unlike both traditional social and grassroots movements as, for most ANC 
supporters, activity was annual. The ANC adopted a pyramid-like organisational form, 
meaning there are both horizontal and vertical mechanisms in place. Local and sectoral 
assemblies exist at a horizontal level but coordinating roles also ensure a hierarchical form of 
communication of the views of the base. The annual assembly is the key event where the 
Secretariat determines the content. Five per cent of members can add an item to the agenda. 
The ANC is closer to the centralized than the decentralized form of political organisation and 
activities are carefully planned and organized. The movement has been able to hold elected 
representatives to account and ensure their fulfilment of promises. The direct lines of 
communication between activists and social movement members has ensured rapid 
communication of concerns and frustrations regarding the political class. The ANC, in its 
geographical spread and organisational structure, sought to ensure the decentralisation of 
power.32 Whilst the membership can contribute to policy formation, much of the practice of 
the organisation at its highest level is in the form of indirect democracy.  
 
The Assemblea divided the territory of Catalonia into ten regions, for organisational 
purposes, with Barcelona becoming Region One. The secretariat was divided into six 
commissions: organització i finances; extensió territorial i sectorial; commissió juridical; 
communicació; hoja de ruta y actes. The ANC has two two main organisational strands. 
Firstly, the Assemblees Territorials. The role of the territorial assembly is to raise awareness 
locally around the independence debate and proselytism is encouraged.  Secondly, we find 
the Assemblees Sectorials. Here the ANC is organised across a range of areas: professionals, 
socials, cultural, etc. The sectorial assemblies provide report on how their sector would 
benefit from independence. The subsequent organisation level is the Secretariat Nacional 
formed by 75 individuals, which are chosen at local (50) and national (25) level. The highest 
layer of the ANC, including its President, is chosen indirectly by this body. The role of the 
Secretariat is to achieve consensus around strategy and tactical issues. It is here that the form 
of the campaigns are determined. A smaller body, the Comitè Executiu is made up of 19 
members. The Assemblea Nacional Catalana is made up of volunteers and members, whose 
 
32 BARNILS, Andreu, La Revolució Tranquil·la: Carme Forcadell i l’Assemblea Nacional Catalana, Rosa dels 
Vents, Barcelona, 2014, p. 136. 
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fees provide much of the funding. The ANC benefits from individual donations and has an 




Identity, values and ideology 
 
 
The nation provides a horizontal sense of collective identity. This can also mean 
participants share core values which can be articulated in ideological terms. This collective 
identity is made up of shared “cultural capital”. Through collective identity processes, 
movement actors develop a shared cultural toolkit (a repertoire of protest methods including 
nonviolent tactics).33 The ANC has used its membership as a vertical channel of 
communication to the leadership. The ideology of the ANC can be termed liberal in terms of 
its relationship to capitalism. Questions of infrastructure and improved economic efficiency 
have formed central components to the demands for independence. The ANC has defined a 
Catalonia that experiences economic disadvantage through its membership of Spain. The 
movement expresses a form of productivism, which has deep roots in a Catalan culture 
convinced of its advanced economic pedigree. The market economy is seen as a natural form, 
with the need for reform recognised though some critique of trans-national capitalism is also 
evident. Given its social basis amongst the middle classes, we find a strong defence of 
national economic sovereignty (against Spain). Catalonia is to emerge as an advanced 
European economy, a vision that we can call inclusionary capitalism. ‘Tiene una gran 
potencia económica y humana para ser un estado rico y competitivo’.34 We also find a 
rhetoric of social justice though little in terms of its practical application. Questions of 
taxation have also formed part of this economic narrative. Taxation is frequently a grievance 
for middle class sectors of any society and questions of injustice around taxation have 
provoked political protest in many contexts. The modern state not only contains a coercive 
 
33 ROBNETT, Belinda, ‘External Political Change, Collective Identities, and Participation in Social Movement 
Organizations’ in MEYER, David S., WHITTIER, Nancy and ROBNETT, Belinda (Eds.), Social Movements. 
Identity, Culture, and the State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 266-285. 
34 Full, ‘Un estat insolidari’, Carpeta Propaganda, Fons Assemblea Nacional Catalana, CEDOC. 
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monopoly in terms of violence but also one in its compulsory enforcement of tax collection.35 
The ANC produced a series of campaigns focussed on the injustice of the Catalan tax 
contribution to the central state.36 At times, calls were made to refuse to send taxes to Madrid 
but given the clear illegality to such actions, these calls stayed merely rhetorical. 
 
 
Social and political activists develop “frames” as a means of developing political 
agency and strategic unity. The pro-independence claims made around democracy, voting 
and self-determination sought to influence global public opinion as unanswerable and 
reasonable demands. These frames included the identity frame, where for Catalan media 
emphasis was placed on distinctiveness. As the movement evolved, it crafted a moral project 
around freedom and justice (rights). The ANC has been skilful as devising what is termed a 
‘justificatory rhetoric’.37 Catalan independence is framed as the embodiment of European 
values of democracy. For many Catalans, the struggle is between democracy and 
undemocratic practices, hence the prominence of slogans such as ‘Queremos votar’. Many of 
the principal public expressions and campaigns of Catalan independence have therefore been 
focussed on the democratic rights of the Catalan people. The right to decide has been used as 
a political mechanism to express Catalan self-determination. Catalan sovereignty is presented 
as representative of a higher ethical order. 
 
As with most movements that ct around the axis of national identity, the ANC 
pursued the strategy to present itself as the voice of the Catalan people.  A Catalan people 
that has embraced sovereignty is testimony to a transformed political environment. Doctrines 
of popular sovereignty conceive ‘the people’ as a historically constructed territorial 
community. This framing of the Catalan people was inevitably that of a single entity 
mobilised for a single purpose. The Catalan people are unique and separate from the Spanish; 
hence, they must be independent. They represent an unbroken lineage of a thousand years of 
history and different to Spaniards in terms of language, values and cultural practices. ‘El 
 
35 MURPHY, Liam B. and NAGEL, Thomas, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2002, pp, 41-42. 
36 Full, ‘Els meus impostos, A Catalunya’ 2013; Full, ‘Un estat insolidari’ and 2014, Full ‘Campanya de 
Sobirania Fiscal. Paguem els nostres Impostos a Catalunya and 2015, Full, ‘Perque Catalunya necessita un 
estat?’, Carpetas 2013, 2014 and 2015, Fons Assemblea Nacional Catalana, CEDOC. 
37 LEACHMAN, Gwendolyn, ‘Legal Framing’, SARAT, Austin (Ed.) Studies in Law, Politics, and Society, Vol. 
61, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, 2013, pp. 25-59. 
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pueblo aparece aquí como una realidad casi sagrada’.38 Thus, ‘the people’ represents a new 
way of imagining political association.39 According to the sovereignty movement, the Catalan 
people have come to represent the embodiment of democracy: dictatorship comes from Spain 
as does judicial repression whilst the Catalans seek only for the will of the democratic 
majority to be expressed. The effect of these strategies has been to embody the moral high 
ground, a superior society held in abeyance by a corrupt and anti-democratic Spain. 
 
As the membership of the ANC spanned the political spectrum, from ultra-leftists to 
conservatives, many of the political declarations of the movement were of necessity bland 
and ambiguous, containing terms like ‘fairness’, ‘justice’ and ‘freedom’, which all could 
identify with and interpret in their own way. 40 Old supporters of independence and the new 
could feel represented through a diffuse ideological phenomenon. The ANC constructed 
internal mechanism to create a shared value system within the organisation and then transmit 
these values across Catalan society. Activists were encouraged to make full use of social 
media, hang the Estelada from their balconies and try to convert the undecided to the 
independence cause.41 Proselytising was to be used to create a virtuous circle of growth in the 
organisation.42 In the fourth mass Diada held in 2015, the event was structured to enable the 
political communication of its core values. The demonstration was broken up into sections, 
each articulating the ANC’s strategic messages: Equilibrio Territorial, Solidaridad, Abiertos 
al Mundo, Sostenibilidad, Igualdad, Innovación, Regeneración Democrática, Educación y 
Cultura, Bienestar y Justicia Social.43 Significantly, the further function of this Diada was to 
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 Prior to the ANC, during the protests of 2006, 2007 and the consultes of 2009 to 
2011, horizontal structures and the absence of individual leaders marked the independence 
movement. The social movements that emerged from 2006 expressed strong reluctance to 
institutionalise themselves and ought to craft a new way of doing politics. The leaderless 
phase of the sovereignty movement came to an end with the emergence of the ANC, when 
Carme Forcadell and Muriel Casals of Òmnium Cultural came to be the public figures of the 
sovereignty movement. Leadership forms can be pivotal in determining the success of 
movements and these two leaders seemed capable of being above much of the internal 
dispute that has been endemic within independence movement. Citizen activists had much 
greater impact than members of political parties and the leadership of the movements 
channelled the grievances rather than simply representing them. Social media has also played 
a key role in the visibility of the movement and its capacity to mobilise.44 With its trend 
towards self-selection, social media provides opportunities to consolidate support networks 
and reach beyond the limitations of traditional media forms. Social media then has functioned 
as a successful avenue of political communication to facilitate the visibility of the 
movement.45 In this, the social movements embrace this new technology, further 
distinguishing themselves from the tired formulas of political parties. These technologies 
have expanded the scoped of recruitment and mobilisation.46 The mobilisation of symbols is 
important in social movements as the movements communicate to a broad public through the 
mass media.47  The ANC has been highly effective in using social media platforms as a ingle 
organisation but its reach has extended further by its local, regional and sectoral groupings 
also being present on various platforms. The scale of the Catalan protests have facilitated 
messaging. However, as we have noted, the Catalan sovereignty movement exists in parallel 
to pro-independence political parties and institutions. Traditionally social movements are 
attention seeking organisations yet in the Catalan case, local broadcast media, including 
regional TV and radio stations, have consistently provided a ready-made platform for the 
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ANC. The Diada of 2012 was organised between the ANC and the regional government of 
Artur Mas, with TV3 given a promotional role for the event.48  
 
 
The Diada of September 2012 was the public expression of emotional, social and 
political grievance and was unprecedented in its scale and influence.  It was notable that 
placards carried on this first mass scale Diada were frequently a popular expression of 
collective grievance, including social claims. Subsequently, the messaging and public 
expression of the Diada was closely managed ensuring unanimity in message and 
communication. The Diada of 2012 was however the moment that control passed from the 
political institutions to the street and the subsequent 12 months would see an intense process 
undertaken by the Catalan political class to domesticate and subordinate the movement to its 
postulates.49 As a direct consequence of the Diada of 2012, Artur Mas called early elections 
in an attempt to capitalise on social pressure. The demonstration of 2012 in Barcelona had 
become a political turning point, driven by the citizens toward a referendum for self-
determination. In 2013, following the Via Catalana, an event again vast in scale, social 
pressure again forced a response from the political class, which agreed to hold a form of 
referendum, called a consultation, announced in December 2013.50 The ANC was key in 
ensuring that some kind of vote, even the symbolic kind as eventually occurred, took place on 
9 November 2014. The symbolic vote held 9 November 2014 had a number of consequences. 
It introduced ‘voting as form of civil disobedience’.51 The turnout of 2.3 million Catalans 
became for many an epic story of national rebirth and triumph though it soon became 
apparent that the vote had no real political outcome.  
 
The ANC is a movement that has had a clear impact on the public sphere. The 
emergence of the ANC changed the nature of party competition in the short term and the 
organisation has had significant indirect impact on the framing of the electoral cycle. The 
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ANC held a degree of political initiative, particularly between 2012 and 2014, where the 
Catalan political class was forced to respond to its pressures. 52 This struggle for control of 
the movement was not completed until the unitary candidature Junts pel Sí incorporated the 
ANC and Òmnium Cultural as direct participants in the election slate of 27 September 2015. 
Since the crisis, parties in the rest of Spain and Catalonia have been particularly notable in 
their incorporation of non-career politicians onto their lists. The parties have sought to share 
the credibility of the social organisations. This can be clearly shown through the direct 
incorporation of the former President of the ANC, Carme Forcadell, as chair of the Catalan 
parliament in 2015. This change is testament to the deep influence held by the ANC over the 
party system.53  Jordi Sànchez as new ANC leader worked in parallel with the then Catalan 
President Artur Mas. However, it can also be seen as an attempt by the dominant pro-
sovereignty party to domesticate the ANC. The leadership change from Carme Forcadell to 
Jordi Sanchez was part of this incorporation and domestication, with the ANC increasingly 
subordinated to a party political agenda.54 Sànchez became the new leader of the Junts per 
Catalunya candidature, a further indication of the transmission belt between the ANC and the 
party system. This was no long march through the institutions by social movement form as 
relations between the civic movement, political parties and elected bodies have been fluid 




Between 2012 and 2014 the ANC crafted an iconography and political brand. This 
was a unique and innovative form of display, visual vocabulary and political communication 
through the annual Diadas. The Diada became the annual ritual of Catalan independence. The 
professionalised choreography of patriotic performance was used to express the 
organisation’s power and mobilising capacity. Participants from across Catalonia discovered 
the power of horizontal comradeship.  Public space thus became part of the articulation and 
spectacle of representation of the Catalan nation, as defined by the ANC. The Diada was an 
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annual affirmation of sovereignty. As the Diada developed year by year, innovations were 
evident in messaging through choices of representational colour: red, yellow, purple etc. 
Echoing Bauman, ‘the central meanings and values of a group are embodied, acted out, and 
laid open to examination and interpretation in symbolic form''.55 Annual slogans were used to 
express both aims, precise moment of the struggle and impending destination. «Catalunya, 
nou estat d’Europa» (2012), «Via Catalana cap a la Independència» (2013), «V-Via 
Catalana» (2014) i «Via Lliure a la República Catalana» (2015) and so on. Public expression 
is also found in the constant production of leaflets, stickers, badges, posters and flags used by 
the movement. The modest costs associated with these forms facilitates mass production and 
distribution. The ANC developed its own semiotic code of political communication, allowing 
its members and supporters to share in the articulation of a collective public identity. Whether 
in digital or analogue form, members and supporters are able to express their collective 
identification.56 
 
Goals and success/failure 
 
 
All political or social movements want to achieve their objectives. A failed movement 
is an attempt at mobilization that never gets off the ground. A movement failure is that of a 
movement, once mobilized, to achieve any of the desired types of outcomes. Movement 
participation should be viewed as a rational way to achieve political goals. For participation 
to be interpreted as rational, social movements must succeed fairly often and their 
achievements must depend at least partly on factors subject to participants’ control. 57 
Assessing success and failure in social and political movements requires consideration of not 
the only the wider context but also the inherent values and beliefs within a movement.58 
Assessing a movement’s success involves determining whether it has achieved its goals. But 
what are its goals? What constitutes a successful movement outcome? Movements may be 
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considered successful to the extent that they achieve their formally stated goals. These 
include the acceptance of a challenging group by its antagonists as a valid representative for a 
legitimate set of interests, and the winning of new advantages for the group.59 Thus the ANC 
has failed in its fundamental objective of the independence of Catalonia yet the organisation 
has been successful in terms of attention seeking, media visibility, international attention and 
its direct influence on the Catalan political system.  
 
 
When prophecy fails 
 
The Catalan movement has been highly unusual in its construction of an optimistic 
culture of prediction with its claim that the independence of Catalonia was not just a 
probability but was imminent. Whilst the response and mobilisation of July 2010 can be 
termed reactive, the development of the Diadas from 2012 can be framed within this 
optimistic narrative of the future.60 An intriguing element of the ANC has been its 
unrealisable temporality. The Catalan movement has been marked by a sense of urgency that 
has repeatedly led to the movement setting of new objectives, dates and signposts that have 
become intrinsic to the independence movement. As one of the progenitors to the ANC, we 
can note that the Moviment per la Independencia (MxI) noted in the summer of 2009, that 
Catalonia would become independent ‘en el marc de la Unió Europea nomes ho 
aconseguirem si esdevé un clam d’una majoria social  incontestable’.61 The foundational 
document of the ANC referred to the need in a referendum for ‘uns resultats incontestables’, 
as well as any referendum taking place ‘supervisat per organismes internacionals’. In its 
foundational documents of 2011, it spoke of ‘l’horització de 2014 es, avui, mes posible que 
mai’. The rhetoric around obtaining a clear social majority was never fully abandoned but as 
events proceeded it no longer seemed a political priority as the belief increased that 
independence was imminent. By 2017, the ANC was proclaiming: ‘Es preveu que al llarg del 
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2017 la Generalitat i el Parlament de Catalunya proclamin la independència…e tr rem així a 
l’etapa de constitució de la sobirania’.62  
 
 
 The ANC constructed a positive political narrative of the possibility of peaceful 
change. In this culture of prophecy, the ANC and others bear resemblances to millenarian 
movements, whether religious or political in orientation. Millenarian movements are almost 
always focused on prophecies predicting future events. The prophecies themselves vary 
widely in their nature and specificity. But those drawn to the prophecies commonly invest 
deeply in them, both emotionally and materially. Almost all of these prophecies, however, 
ultimately fail. Dates and events pass without either the cataclysmic or wonderful 
consequences anticipated: ‘ideological cris[es] born of prophetic failures [are] a virtually 
universal feature of the careers of millenarian groups’.63 When the prophecies fail to come 
true, believers are often shocked, disappointed, and bewildered. Counterintuitively, the vast 
majority of groups making millennial predictions weather the storm of disconfirmation quite 
well. Rather than driving members away in doubt and frustration, the failures may intensify 
the commitments of followers, at least for a time.64 As for social movements, those that are 
prophecy making are required to engage in a process of denial, forgetting or reinterpretation 





The Assemblea Nacional Catalana has resisted insertion in a clear typology of either 
social or grassroots movements. Social movement theory has long noted that radicalisation 
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can be one outcome of movement failure.66 The broader Catalan sovereignty movement until 
2017 represented can be been termed "a romantic revolt in politics".67 Moral outrage and 
collective shock at police violence and the imprisonment of the civic and political leadership 
led into a late radicalisation of the movement. The events of 20 September 2017 saw the first 
real expression of spontaneous popular mobilisation, which the ANC joined, but significantly 
did not lead.68 The referendum 1 October 2017 was attempted and supported by activists 
from the CDR who began to develop a strategy of resistance. A parallel organisation, the 
Movimiento Escuelas Abiertas, brought together parents in an attempt to occupy polling 
stations and ensure the referendum took place. The vast majority of the 4300 Catalan polling 
stations were occupied by these movements. The initial phase of the CDR can be termed that 
of horizontal self-organisation to support the referendum.69 Subsequently the CDR re-
emerged as Comités de Defensa de la República. A transitional phase from the positive 
tactical approach of the ANC to the more disruptive actions of the CDR lasted for two years. 
For the first time, new participatory actions including transport disruption, minor acts of 
sabotage and amore confrontational political style emerged. Yet as we have noted, there has 
always been within the Catalan sovereignty movement a relationship between institutions and 
the civic movement. This institutional character has continued with the new social 
movements. The CDR posited themselves as an activist rival to the ANC, leading to a 
radicalisation of this original organisation. A shared characteristic of the CDR/Tsunami is the 
role of younger, educated, middle-class activists who organise through social media 
messaging platforms. The emergence of this new form represents a full articulation of the 
social movement form, unlike, we have seen, the repertoire, messaging and strategy adopted 
by the ANC. Direct action and the articulation of civil disobedience represented the end point 
to the strategy adopted by the ANC, 2012 to 2017.  
 
Although radicalisation suggests the embracing of increasingly disruptive agendas, 
this should not be seen as irrational. Rather, new mechanisms are chosen and are rationalised 
within a movement.70 The CDR are a horizontal form of organisation, have an assembly like 
character and are absent of leadership. They emerged as a part response of the ambivalence of 
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the ANC around the referendum. The CDR are organised at a local level. Ideologically they 
are radically left and socially critical, including of the regional institutions of the Catalan 
government. However, as noted, a radical response has also emerged within traditional 
middle-class sectors so the CDR combine radical left messaging combined with a 
commitment from rightist nationalists to the organisation. Civil disobedience, which had been 
deemed unnecessary by the ANC through its repeated affirmation of its peaceful values, 
became an increasing part of the repertoire of the Catalan sovereignty movement.  
 
 
The events of September to December 2017 testified to the strategic limits of the 
Assemblea Nacional Catalana. Seven successive and vast mass mobilisations each September 
since 2012 demonstrated their political limitation. The ANC often seemed to interpret its 
successful annual mobilization mobilisations as themselves providing the legitimacy to break 
with Spain. The Catalan sovereignty movement, which had shown extraordinary longevity, in 
contrast to the 15M, finally reached a strategic end point in the autumn of 2017.71 The 
Catalan movement for independence is continuing to digest the implications of the failure of 
secession in October 2017. The political defeat has led to a reconfiguration of independence 
narratives. For most of the period until the attempted independence referendum of October 
2017, the ANC was a key political actor. At times between 2012 and 2015, it seemed able to 
determine the political decision making of a regional government and its associated parties. 
The victorious electoral slate of September 2015 represented the subordination of the ANC to 
the party system. The ever-greater imbrication within the broader alliance of 
ANC/institutions/parties meant the ANC was unprepared for the arrival of contentious 
politics, as occurred from the autumn of 2017. The strategic and tactical choices made by the 
ANC between 2012 and 2017, and their ultimate failure in October 2017, has meant that 
subsequently the Assemblea Nacional Catalana is but one social actor amongst many and no 
longer has a monopoly over social mobilisation. Post-2017, the ANC has supported 
increasingly radical tactics but this confirms the comparative weakness of the organisation 
which is no longer a dominant element within a wider sovereignty movement. The 
Assemblea is, as we have argued, sui generis, but the failure of this political form brings to an 
end the Catalan anomaly within a wider European protest culture. 
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